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Quare?  Argument in David Daube, 
after Karl Popper 
Ernest Metzger* 
Daube's work has a quality we can admire even when we are not 
persuaded by it: he will explain a text in a way which is entirely 
unexpected, but which seems suddenly to reveal something that 
had lain unnoticed.  How does he do this?  According to Alan Rod-
ger,1 Daube would notice something in a text and ask why it was 
there; he would then explain the text by answering the question.2 
  This essay discusses Daube's method of reading texts, and 
discusses in particular why it is useful to begin with a question, 
how Daube finds the right questions to ask, and what makes one 
answer better than another.  I argue that Daube's method of 
reading texts produces the explanations it does because it does 
not rely on inferences from the text so much as prior guesses about 
what the text means.  Though much of this essay is concerned 
with Daube's work, my interest is not in Daube's work alone, but 
in a wider issue I regard as enormously important: how a method 
like Daube's contributes new ideas to the Roman law literature. 
                                         
*  In preparing this essay I have had the benefit of correspondence 
with Daube's widow, Helen Smelser Daube, and the advice of Charles 
Donahue, Jr., of the Harvard Law School.  
1 Above,  11–14. 
2  A few examples of this kind of argument may be found in these 
works by Daube: "Certainty of Price," in D. Daube (ed.), Studies in the 
Roman Law of Sale (Oxford, 1959) [= Collected Studies, 2:757], 17–20 
(D.18.1.37); "Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5," in R. S. Bagnall and W. V. Harris 
(edd.), Studies in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur Schiller (Leiden, 
1986) [= Collected Studies, 2:1403], 33–38 (D.12.5.5); "Generalisations in 
D.18.1, de contrahenda emptione," in Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio-
Ruiz (Naples, n.d.) [= Collected Studies, 1:527], 1:186–92 (D.18.1.28); "Das 
Selbstverständliche in der Rechtsgeschichte," 90 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 1, 12–13 
(1973), translated as "The Self-Understood in Legal History," 18 Jur. Rev. 
(n.s.) 126 (1973) [= Collected Studies, 2:1277] (Gaius 1.5); "The Earliest 
Structure of the Gospels," 5 New Testament Studies 174 [= Collected 
Works, 2:329], 174–87 (1959) (Mark xii. 1–37; Matt. ii. 13–18); Roman 
Law: Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects (Edinburgh, 1969), 72–3 
(XII Tab. V, 4),  93–4 (D.46.3.67); "The Finale of Horace's 'Satire' 1.4," 22 
Index 371, 371–88 (1994) (Hor. Serm. 1.4.139–143).  The first four of these 
texts are discussed below. 28  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
  In discussing Daube's "question" I rely on certain works of 
Karl Popper, a philosopher of science from the last century.  This 
needs some explanation.  Daube was not influenced by Popper, so 
far as I am aware.3  The value of Popper's thought to this discus-
sion lies in the fact that Popper was a critic of induction, and that 
Daube's method of reading texts is non-inductive.  Popper very 
much favored the kind of creative, hypothesis-driven research 
that Daube practiced, and Popper strongly defended this kind of 
research against the claim that a researcher is simply a fact-
finder.  Accordingly Popper's works, I believe, explain in an excep-
tionally clear way what makes Daube's "question" valuable.4  On 
the other hand, Popper held certain controversial views about 
induction, i.e., that one may prefer a hypothesis based in part on 
its ability to survive, rigorous, negative tests ("falsification").   
Popper's theory of falsification, in fact, is what he is best known 
for.  I should make clear that these views are not part of this es-
say, simply because, in my opinion, they are not useful to histori-
ans — something Popper himself all but admitted.5 
I.  Ulpian on the certainty of price in sale 
It will be useful to have a single text to lead the discussion, and 
for this I use the following text of Ulpian: D.18.1.37 (3 Disputa-
tions), on the requirements of a contract of sale.  The text was 
analysed by Daube in a 1959 volume dedicated to de Zulueta.6 
                                         
3  I have no reason to believe that Daube consciously followed Pop-
per, and I am not aware that Daube ever cited Popper.  However, I have 
learned from Daube's widow, Helen Smelser Daube, that although her 
husband, as far as she knows, did not own any of Popper's books, she had 
many conversations with him about Popper.  She herself attended a 
seminar by Popper at the London School of Economics in 1952.   
4  On the other hand, a different essay could be written comparing 
Daube to, for example, R. G. Collingwood (who argues that history is a 
reenactment by the historian) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (who accepts 
Vorurteil as necessary to the understanding of a text).  See R. G. Colling-
wood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 1946), 282–302; H.-G. Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, 2nd ed. (London, 1975), 238–40; P. Skagestad, Making Sense 
of History: The Philosophies of Popper and Collingwood (Oslo, 1975), 87–
91.  There is also room for comparison in the psychology of art; there is a 
clear counterpart to Daube's question-and-answer in the "making and 
matching" described by Ernst Gombrich, himself a Popperian.  See E. H. 
Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 5th ed. (London, 1977), 157–61. 
5  See the discussion in note 29 below, and the authorities cited in 
note 43 below. 
6  Daube, "Certainty of Price" (note 2), 9–45.  This text, as with all 
other texts from the Digest in this essay, is that of T. Mommsen and P. 
Krüger (edd.), Digesta Iustiniani Augusti (Berlin, 1870; reprinted 1962–
63). 2004  Quare?  29 
 
 
Si quis fundum iure hereditario sibi delatum ita vendidisset: 
"erit tibi emptus tanti, quanti a testatore emptus est," mox 
inveniatur non emptus, sed donatus testatori, videtur quasi 
sine pretio facta venditio, ideoque similis erit sub condicione 
factae venditioni, quae nulla est, si condicio defecerit. 
If one had sold a plot of land, which came to him by inheri-
tance, with the provision that "it shall be purchased for as 
much as it was purchased by the testator," and it is then dis-
covered that it was not purchased by but given to the testa-
tor, it is treated as a sale made without a price, and is there-
fore similar to a sale under a condition, which is void if the 
condition fails. 
Daube addresses the extent of interpolation in the text (the 
meaning, he notes, is quite clear).  The question raised in the text 
is whether the events give rise to a sale which fails for want of a 
price.  In the state in which it comes to us, the text makes it clear 
that the seller has introduced the "erit .  .  . est" language inno-
cently, and that only later is it discovered that the sale lacks a 
price.  There is, as Daube notes, a superficial resemblance to a 
condition that fails, but treating the parties' ignorance and sub-
sequent realization as a failed condition makes a jumble out of 
invalid and imperfect sales.  Hence the clause introduced by ideo-
que is unlikely to be Ulpian's.7 
  Beseler undertook to restore this text8 and excised not only 
the ideoque clause (probably, as Daube suggests, on the argument 
that ideoque is a sign of interpolation) but a great deal more.  I 
have set out his emendations less conventionally to make clear 
the extent of his changes.9 
Si quis fundum, qui defuncto donatus erat, iure hereditario 
sibi delatum ita vendiderit vendidisset: "erit tibi emptus 
tanti, quanti a testatore emptus est," nulla est venditio mox 
inveniatur non emptus, sed donatus testatori, videtur quasi 
sine pretio facta venditio, ideoque similis erit sub condicione 
factae venditioni, quae nulla est, si condicio defecerit. 
If someone has sold a plot of land which had been given to one 
deceased (and which came to the seller by inheritance) with 
                                         
7  Daube, "Certainty of Price" (note 2), 19. 
8  G. von Beseler, "Romanistische Studien," 8 T. v. R. 279, 291 
(1927). 
9  Id.: — fundum <, qui defuncto donatus erat,> — <vendiderit> 
[vendidisset] — est, <nulla est venditio> [—].  30  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
the provision that "it shall be purchased for as much as it was 
purchased by the testator," there is no sale. 
Daube mentions several inappropriate points of style in Beseler's 
text, but his main objection is that, on Beseler's view, the compil-
ers have added a fact not in the original: that the parties have 
agreed on the condition in ignorance of the true state of affairs.  
Daube does not speculate on Beseler's reasons for this change 
(except to say that it was done as part of the addition of "ideoque 
. . . .").  He marks his disagreement with Beseler by the following 
pointed statement:10 
[O]ne can think of no plausible motive which might have in-
duced anyone to turn Beseler's text into the present. 
I postpone discussion of this statement for later: it expresses the 
kind of question which Rodger takes as the hallmark of Daube's 
method.  For now it is enough to point out that this is the sort of 
question Beseler did not feel the need to ask. 
On the other hand, "plausible motive" aside, we can guess at 
Beseler's reasoning without too much difficulty.  He has begun 
with idea that ideoque signals an interpolation.11  He has then 
noted that the nature of the interpolation is a misplaced analogy 
with conditions.  He has then concluded that the introduction of 
the vendor's ignorance is of a piece with the misplaced analogy; 
that the compilers have misunderstood the thrust of the text 
(certum pretium) and attempted to make the text fit a rule about 
conditions; and that to accomplish this they have inserted a spu-
rious discussion of ignorance and subsequent realization.12  Be-
                                         
10  Daube, "Certainty of Price" (note 2), 18. 
11  See G. Beseler, [Miszellen], 45 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 456, 456 (1925) 
(speaking of ideoque, among other expressions): "Diese Redeform ist in den 
Klassikertexten immer oder meistens unecht." 
12  The context gives another clue to Beseler's reasoning.  He was re-
sponding to a discussion of risk in contracts of sale in E. Seckel and E. 
Levy, "Die Gefahrtragung beim Kauf im klassischen römischen Recht," 47 
ZSS (rom. Abt.) 117 (1927).  Seckel and Levy had discussed sales in which 
the price, though certain, was unknown to the buyer (see D.18.1.7.1, 2 
(Ulpian 28 Sab.)).  They commented that this sort of sale was valid but not 
perfect, and in the course of this discussion, at 162 n.4, directed the reader 
"Vgl. auch Ulp. D. eod. 37."  Beseler refers to this footnote at the end of his 
restoration of D.18.1.37.  He no doubt recognized that Seckel and Levy 
have miscited § 37: the parties' knowledge or lack of knowledge is, in that 
text, beside the point.  And perhaps, in his enthusiasm to make this clear 
to readers of Seckel and Levy (and to take a dig at the authors), he simply 
dismissed the whole discussion of knowledge as interpolation.  
Beseler has a good point, of course: the mox inveniatur etc. is not 
strictly relevant.  But Daube very plausibly says that the case is "no doubt 2004  Quare?  31 
 
 
seler leaves us with a text that raises certain questions of style,13 
but there is no doubt that he has accounted for the interpolations 
(if I have reconstructed his thoughts correctly), and that his rea-
soning is entirely orthodox. 
  Daube's reasoning, on the other hand, is not orthodox.  He 
asks how the text came to be changed, and then simply suggests 
an answer.  Justinian, he says, was particularly proud of having 
settled a dispute among the classical jurists14 regarding the valid-
ity of contracts of sale or hire whose price or charge was to be 
fixed by a third person.  Justinian decided that this sort of con-
tract was conditional and would fail if the third person, in the 
event, did not fix the price.15  Daube suggests that, when the 
compilers turned their attention to D.18.1.37, it occurred to them 
that Justinian's decision might solve this controversy as well.   
Ulpian's choice of words may have reminded them of Justinian's 
decision; Ulpian says that, because the land had been given to the 
testator, the sale was quasi sine pretio facta, and these words per-
haps called to mind Justinian's words, quasi nullo pretio statuto 
(C.4.38.15.2).  The compilers, according to Daube, therefore ap-
plied Justinian's solution to this text, treating the case as one of 
an heir selling conditionally.  Ulpian's text, of course, makes no 
mention of third persons; Daube's explanation is based solely on 
the supposed enthusiasm of the compilers for Justinian's decision 
and the way in which that enthusiasm may have left its mark on 
Ulpian's text. 
  Whatever the merits of Daube's argument, there is no deny-
ing its main appeal: if the compilers were enthusiastic in the way 
Daube describes, then the text would look just as we have it.  But 
do we have any reason for accepting Daube's argument, other 
                                         
one which occurred in reality" and is set out as it happened.  Daube, 
"Certainty of Price" (note 2), 19. 
13  Noted in Daube, "Certainty of Price" (note 2), 18. 
14  See Gaius 3.140 (sale), 143 (hire). 
15  C.4.38.15 (AD 530): 
Super rebus venumdandis, si quis ita rem comparavit, ut res vendita 
esset, quanti Titius aestimaverit, magna dubitatio exorta est multis 
antiquae prudentiae cultoribus.  1. Quam decidentes censemus, cum 
huiusmodi conventio super venditione procedat "quanti ille aestima-
verit," sub hac condicione stare venditionem, ut, si quidem ipse qui 
nominatus est pretium definierit, omnimodo secundum eius aestima-
tionem et pretia persolvi et venditionem ad effectum pervenire . . . .  
2. Sin autem ille vel noluerit vel non potuerit pretium definire, tunc 
pro nihilo esse venditionem quasi nullo pretio statuto . . . . 
See also D.19.2.25 pr. (Gaius 10 ed. prov., but interpolated); Institutes 
3.23.1, 3.24.1. 32  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
than this close fit between the explanation and the text?  On this 
point some would prefer Beseler's argument, because the pattern 
of interpolation he identifies, uncertain as it is, nevertheless does 
support his argument: on the basis of comparable evidence (com-
parable instances of ideoque) he has formulated a rule ("ideoque 
signals an interpolation") which is applied to the text at hand and 
tells us by deduction that the text is interpolated.  Even if people 
differ on how clearly the ideoque-rule is made out and how deeply 
the interpolation extends, the method of argument seems to be 
above reproach.  Beseler has apparently achieved something lack-
ing in Daube's argument: Daube has given us an answer, but no 
reason for accepting the answer.  Some might even say that Be-
seler has given an argument, Daube only his opinion. 
  For purposes of understanding D.18.1.37, it makes a differ-
ence which argument one prefers.  Both Beseler and Daube agree 
that the text is interpolated, and indeed both agree that "ideoque" 
here is not classical.  But the arguments produce two very differ-
ent texts.  Beseler's argument produces a text in which the issue 
of the seller's knowledge is simply absent.  Daube's argument pro-
duces a text in which the issue of the seller's knowledge (though 
irrelevant) is present, a text which therefore holds out to the 
would-be buyer some prospect of a remedy.16 
II.  Objectivity and induction 
For many, Beseler's explanation of D.18.1.37 is the better one 
because Beseler's method is the more objective.  The questions a 
romanist asks are usually regarded as questions with (theoreti-
cally) objective answers.  This is presumably why the quality of 
argument matters in the first place.  Even a question with a good 
deal of abstraction, e.g., whether the ius honorarium exerted 
greater influence on the law at the end of the Republic than 
thereafter, is regarded as a question with an objective answer.17  
And objectivity might seem to be best served by showing that the 
right explanation originates in a body of evidence, and not in the 
researcher's impressions of what the right explanation looks 
like.18  That is Beseler's apparent advantage: he begins with ex-
                                         
16  That, at any rate, is what Daube believes: Daube, "Certainty of 
Price" (note 2), 18. 
17  See, for example, the treatment in W. Kunkel, An Introduction to 
Roman Legal and Constitutional History, 2nd ed. trans. J. M. Kelly 
(Oxford, 1973), 81–82.  
18  Daube himself seems to have doubted what he took to be the as-
sumption of legal historians "daß der Wissenschaftler sich zu einer gewis-2004  Quare?  33 
 
 
amples, showing a pattern of usage of ideoque in ancient sources.  
A reader sees that the pattern lies in the sources, not in Beseler's 
head, and if he is satisfied that the sources say what they purport 
to say, then he demands nothing more from Beseler by way of 
objectivity. 
The inductive power of Beseler's examples has certain obvi-
ous limits.  We can accept, on the basis of the surviving evidence, 
that Beseler has made a very good case for the ideoque-pattern, 
and that the pattern is a reliable one for many purposes.  But to 
speak strictly of "probability," and assert that "Beseler's explana-
tion is more probable than Daube's," is not possible.  There is no 
"text-transmission deity" who has guaranteed the survival of 
every usage and pattern, something a coherent sense of probabil-
ity requires.19  This, in fact, is the unstated foundation of Lenel's 
criticism of Beseler's philological method.  Where Beseler notices 
that a word or expression is rare in juristic sources, Lenel re-
minds him, first, that rarity is a function of the underlying sam-
ple,20 and then, that if a particular usage of a word is otherwise 
unattested in one's sample, there may be a good reason for that 
fact, unknown to us; it does not mean the usage is impossible or 
even unlikely.21  In short, the state of the evidence precludes any 
genuine talk of probability.22 
                                         
sen Stufe von Objectivität aufschwingen kann."  Daube, "Das Selbstver-
ständliche" (note 2), 1. 
19  I am obviously skirting the far more difficult question, whether a 
multiplicity of examples ever makes any explanation "more probable."  I do 
not discuss this below, but Popper's views on the question are summarized 
well in R. Corvi, An Introduction to the Thought of Karl Popper (London, 
1997), 36–41, and D. Gillies, "Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of 
Probability," in A. O'Hear (ed.), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems 
[Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39] (Cambridge, 1995), 103–20.  
20  O. Lenel, "Kritisches und Antikritisches," 49 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 1, 
18–23 (1929).  Lenel's point is simply that some of the words and expres-
sions that Beseler regards as justinianic are found in classical literary 
sources. 
21 For example, Lenel criticizes Beseler's rejection of coniux as 
justinianic on the basis of two doubtful occurrences in the Vocabularium 
Iurisprudentiae Romanae.  Lenel (note 20), 20; see G. von Beseler, "Miscel-
lanea Graecoromana," in Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante (Milan, 1930), 
2:63 n.6.  Lenel suggests that the jurists perhaps often, but not always, 
preferred synonyms to coniux.  This is all it takes to see off Beseler's 
argument. 
22 The probability issues that arise in philological interpolation-
hunts are better recognized now than they once were.  Albertario, like 
Beseler, argued with great specificity that certain words or expressions 
were peculiar to the compilers.  E. Albertario, Introduzione storica all 
studio del diritto romano Giustinianeo (Milan, 1935), 50–51.  Buckland 
answers Albertario with perfect Daubean logic: even if they are not at-34  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
  This is not, of course, a rejection of induction per se, but only 
a rejection of the idea that, in comparing one explanation with 
another, many examples are necessarily more probative than few.  
Inductive reasoning, in fact, very much favors Beseler over 
Daube, simply because Beseler has given examples of what he 
believes has taken place in D.18.1.37, where Daube has given no 
examples whatsoever.  In Beseler's examples, there is apparently 
some probative value, however small, to the meaning of ideoque, 
etc., in D.18.1.37.  Daube's evidence (C.4.38.15, on prices fixed by 
third persons) has nothing in common with D.18.1.37: we recall 
that Ulpian's text makes no mention of third persons, and that 
there is simply no connection between D.18.1.37 and C.4.38.15, 
other than the one Daube asks us to accept.  The critic would say 
his explanation "is true if it's true."  Induction also favors Beseler 
because his role as researcher seems more passive: he opens the 
Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae, and it gives up certain 
information sua sponte. 
The issue here is whether Daube can make a case (as indeed 
he tries to) without any pretence to induction whatsoever. 
III.  Karl Popper 
Karl Popper (1902–1994) is probably the best known philosopher 
of science from the last century.23  His principal writings are on 
epistemology, and his research led him to certain conclusions 
about the acquisition of knowledge in both the natural and social 
sciences.24  Very little needs to be said here about Popper's broad 
epistemological theory, except that he argued tirelessly against 
                                         
tested in classical sources, why should they not be?  W. W. Buckland, 
"Interpolations in the Digest: A Criticism of Criticism," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 
1273, 1289 (1941).  The problem of generalizing usage in this way is 
discussed in D. Johnston, "Justinian's Digest: The Interpretation of Inter-
polation," 9 Oxford J. Leg. Studies 149, 150 (1989). 
23  The principal work by which he made his scientific reputation was 
Logik der Forschung, first published in 1934, and first published in 
English in 1959: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959; revised 
1968).  An earlier epistemological work, superseded by Logik der For-
schung, was first published only in 1979: Karl R. Popper, Die beiden 
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie [1930–33], ed. T. E. Hansen 
(Tübingen, 1979).  A second edition appeared in 1994. 
24  In social relations he argued against a form of historicism he 
found in Plato, Hegel, and Marx, and in favor of what he called the "open 
society."  His principal writings in this field are The Open Society and its 
Enemies, 5th ed. (London, 1966), and The Poverty of Historicism (London, 
1961).  Essays on the same themes were published in In Search of a Better 
World (London, 1992) and, after his death, in Lesson of this Century 
(London, 1997). 2004  Quare?  35 
 
 
the claims of induction in all sciences.  According to Popper, in-
duction from examples cannot produce certainty, however many 
examples are brought forward, and however clear the observed 
regularity or "law" appears to be.25  Certainty exists whenever a 
law is falsified by an observation, but no accumulation of observa-
tions will ever verify it.26  None of this shakes Popper's faith in 
scientific method: he does not propose abandoning observation as 
the basis of research,27 and even less would he reduce "science" to 
the subjective experience of the scientist.28  His concern instead is 
with certain very practical issues that matter to any researcher in 
any field: how conclusions are expressed and criticized, and what 
makes one theory better than another.29 
                                         
25  Popper argues that the problem was correctly identified, but in-
correctly solved, by Hume.  See Popper, "Two Faces of Common Sense" 
(note 28), 85–90; L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), David Hume: Treatise of Human 
Nature, 2nd ed. rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978), book I, part III, sec. xii.  
It is worth pointing out that Popper's "rejection of certainty" is by no 
means an eccentric view.  See D. Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restate-
ment and Defence (Chicago, 1994), 2: "[A]lmost everyone these days is a 
fallibilist; almost no one now supposes that empirical statements, even 
simple observational ones, can be established with certainty."  This con-
sensus extends even to Thomas Kuhn, one of Popper's principal intellec-
tual opponents.  See B. Barnes, "Thomas Kuhn," in Q. Skinner (ed.), The 
Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), 87: 
"Like the rationalists [Kuhn] cannot see how scientists reason securely 
from the data to the correct theory. But this leads him to ask whether the 
theory might not be accepted on some other basis." 
26  A concise treatment of Popper's mature views on falsification are 
in K. R. Popper, "Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution to the Problem of 
Induction," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, rev. ed. 
(Oxford, 1979), 1–31. 
27  K. R. Popper, "Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge," in Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed. (London, 1989), 235; 
idem, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 131–33. 
28  See K. R. Popper, "Two Faces of Common Sense: An Argument for 
Commonsense Realism and against the Commonsense Theory of 
Knowledge," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, rev. ed. 
(Oxford, 1979), 35–37. 
29  The question of preference among theories is a contentious one 
among Popper's followers: see Miller (note 25), 113–14; I. Lakatos, "Falsifi-
cation and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in I. 
Lakatos and A. Musgrave (edd.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge, 1970), 91–195, especially 95–103.  Popper himself admitted 
that his solution was unsatisfactory i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .   K .  R .  P o p p e r ,  
"Supplementary Remarks (1978)," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolution-
ary Approach, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1979), 367–74.  Whatever its general 
merits, theory selection based on negative testing is not useful to the 
study of Roman legal texts, in my opinion: (1) the evidence is not complete 
enough to allow "rigorous testing"; (2) the time during which a given 
theory has been in currency is significant in Popper's theory but means 36  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
  As I mentioned above, my interest here is not in Popper's so-
called solution to the problem of induction, but in his more gen-
eral discussions of induction and scientific method.  Popper ex-
presses certain anti-inductivist views that I believe Daube shared, 
and that explain very clearly and specifically Daube's exceptional 
creativity in reading texts.  These views, generally speaking, re-
ject the idea that a researcher may passively observe patterns in a 
body of evidence, and they offer an alternative description of how 
any researcher, including a historian, may explain an event — 
such as the condition of a text.  These views are discussed below. 
IV.  Historical explanation 
Popper was eager to discredit the idea of "pure observation."   
Some of his contemporaries in the early part of the last century30 
had assumed that an observer could watch a series of events, and 
that some regularity or "law" would emerge from the events and 
proprio motu make itself apparent to the observer.  Scientific 
observation, according to this school, is passive, or at least uncor-
rupted by the observer's thoughts: the evidence speaks to the 
observer and the observer reports what he hears.  One who held 
this view would, for example, accept that when a romanist like 
Beseler looks at a series of texts and identifies a word or phrase 
as "peculiar to the compilers," the texts have given up this conclu-
sion without any substantive assistance from Beseler himself.  In 
reply Popper makes a very practical observation: unless the con-
clusion is at least partly in the observer's mind at the outset, he 
will not know what evidence to look at.31  The observer begins 
                                         
nothing in Roman law; and (3) to follow Popper in this respect would 
require us to favor theories which, by chance, have not been "falsified" by 
the survival of some piece of evidence, and to reject an entire theory which 
seems to explain a great deal about the Roman world but is contradicted 
by a single text.  Similar objections may be found in Skagestad (note 4), 
94. 
30  Popper's own account of his battles with the Vienna Circle, and 
logical positivism generally, are in his autobiography, K. Popper, Unended 
Quest (La Salle, 1982), 80–90.  Many corrections to Popper's own account 
may be found in M. H. Hacohen, Karl Popper: The Formative Years 1902–
1945 (Cambridge, 2000), 208–13.  There are also two very good popular 
accounts: B. Magee, Confessions of a Philosopher (London, 1997), 55–68; 
D. Edmonds and J. Eidinow, Wittgenstein's Poker (New York, 2001), 165–
73.  Popper believed strongly that positivism ("what is true is what is 
proven true") was hindering the proper understanding of scientific know-
ledge.  On this brand of positivism see Lakatos (note 29), 91–92; Popper, 
"Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowledge" (note 27), 228. 
31  K. R. Popper, "The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of 
Knowledge," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, rev. ed. 2004  Quare?  37 
 
 
with some manner of conclusion — a hypothesis — and uses the 
hypothesis to find his evidence.  He is not overtly looking to shore 
up some preconceived answer, but only trying to isolate the kind 
of evidence which may prove helpful.  Without a hypothesis, noth-
ing is relevant, and hence nothing can be examined.32  Accord-
ingly on Popper's view, the justinianic words and phrases which 
Beseler identifies may be exactly what he says they are, but he 
nevertheless actively assisted in their discovery: unless he had 
first stopped to ask, e.g., whether ideoque was justinianic, he 
would not have examined texts with ideoque. 
Popper's view, therefore, is that scientific observation is not 
passive but "theory-laden."33  Every observer has in his head cer-
tain hypotheses which guide his observations and indeed in-
terpret the evidence at the very moment the observation is made, 
and observation is impossible without such hypotheses.34  Theory-
laden observation is of course a very old idea;35 Popper had the 
                                         
(Oxford, 1979), 342, 344.  See also K. R. Popper, "Towards a Rational 
Theory of Tradition," in Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed. (London, 
1989), 128 (note omitted): 
Those among you who hold the opposite view and who believe that 
scientific theories are the result of observations, I challenge to start 
observing here and now and to give me the scientific results of your 
observations. . . .  But even if you go on to the end of your lives, 
notebook in hand, writing down everything you observe, and if you 
finally bequeath this important notebook to the Royal Society, asking 
them to make science out of it, the Royal Society might preserve it as 
a curiosity, but decidedly not as a source of knowledge. 
32  In keeping with his own falsification solution, Popper regarded 
hypotheses as something to be retained but refined over time; conven-
tionally, a hypothesis is replaced by a theory, after experiment has proved 
the hypothesis to be "true." See Popper, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 
131.  
33 Popper,  Open Society (note 24), 2:259–60; idem, Poverty of Histori-
cism (note 24), 134; idem, "On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics," 
in  Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed. (London, 1989), 184–93; idem, 
"Science: Problems, Aims, Responsibilities," in M. A. Notturno (ed.), The 
Myth of the Framework (London, 1994), 86; idem, "The Pluralist Approach 
to History," in M. A. Notturno (ed.), The Myth of the Framework (London, 
1994), 145. 
34  See especially the quote reproduced above in note 31. 
35  It is an idea found in, among others, Vico, Locke, Hume, and of 
course Kant.  On Vico's claim to be the first to develop the idea, see I. 
Berlin, "Vico's Theory of Knowledge and its Sources," in Three Critics of 
the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. H. Hardy (London, 2000), 
128, 130–32, and R. G. Alberoni, Gli Esplatori del Tempo: Le Concezioni 
della Storia da Vico a Popper (Milan, 1993), 31.  Popper discusses this 
aspect of Kant's thought in K. Popper, "Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher 
of the Enlightenment," in In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays 38  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
bold aim to develop the idea for the natural sciences.36  His hope 
was to debunk the pretension that scientists may be pure observ-
ers and reporters of truth.37  He described the two opposing views 
in colorful but useful language: "the bucket and the searchlight."38  
The older view is the bucket view, because it envisages a re-
searcher blindly accepting information into a bucket and then 
examining the information for patterns.39  Popper's own view is 
the searchlight view, because it envisages the researcher selec-
tively illuminating the particular evidence which, on his current 
hypothesis, needs examination.40  
The "searchlight" is Popper's way of indicating to the reader 
that observation is possible only with the help of a hypothesis.  
But what exactly a hypothesis includes, and how the observer 
uses it to explain events, is part of a larger scheme: Popper's de-
scription of scientific and historical explanation.41  What Popper 
                                         
from Thirty Years (London, 1994), 131–32.  It is a very common view 
today: see Skinner's introduction in Q. Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand 
Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), especially 10–12. 
36  He regarded himself as building on Kant, to whom he attributed 
the first assaults on induction from observation in the natural sciences: 
"Kant saw more clearly than anyone before or since how absurd it was to 
assume that Newton's theory could be derived from observations."  Popper, 
"On the Status of Science" (note 33), 185.  Newton: "This rule we must 
follow, that the argument of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses."  
I. Newton, Mathematical Principles, trans. A. Mott, rev. F. Cajori 
(Berkeley, 1962), 2:400.   
37  See J. Agassi, "Towards Honest Public Relations of Science," in S. 
Amsterdamski (ed.), The Significance of Popper's Thought (Amsterdam, 
1996), 39–57. 
38  Popper, "The Bucket and the Searchlight" (note 31), 341–47; Pop-
per, Open Society (note 24), 2:260–61. 
39  To insist that the observation and recording of facts be without 
recourse to a priori guesses of any kind is what Hempel (see below note 
41) calls the "narrow inductivist conception of scientific enquiry."  C. G. 
Hempel,  Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), 11.   
Popper calls it "observationism."  Popper, "Science" (note 33), 84.  It is 
illustrated in a recent article which purports to advise lawyers on how to 
do empirical research: L. Epstein and G. King, "Exchange: Empirical 
Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 45 
(2002): "[T]he author of the research is entirely irrelevant . . . . [S]entences 
that begin 'I think' or 'I believe' are beside the point."   
40  In some works Popper associated the idea of active observation 
with a biological desire of humans to solve problems by choosing and 
sometimes altering their surroundings.  See, e.g., K. Popper, "Knowledge 
and the Shaping of Reality," in In Search of a Better World (London, 1992), 
12–17. 
41  Whether the method is entirely Popper's own, or owes something 
to C. G. Hempel (1905–1997, professor of philosophy and author of The 
Philosophy of Natural Science, 1966), is a matter of debate.  Compare 
Popper,  Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 144–45 n.1, and idem, Open 2004  Quare?  39 
 
 
describes is a model for explaining events without falling into the 
error of induction, and at the same time preserving conventional 
scientific practice.42  It is a model that he applies equally to the 
activity of social scientists (including historians43) and natural 
scientists.44  It is easily illustrated with an example from ordinary 
life. 
A person sees a child falling ill in a candy shop, and concludes 
that the child became ill by eating too much candy.  How did he 
come to this conclusion?  The answer is that he made a causal link 
between the event he was trying to explain (the illness) and 
certain facts that he knew or supposed (the child had been eating 
candy).  The crucial step in this procedure is in the way he makes 
this causal link; that a child has eaten candy, after all, does not 
spontaneously explain why the child became ill.  This step is ach-
ieved, according to Popper, with the help of universal laws.  Here, 
the observer has used several such laws, e.g., "too much candy 
makes people ill," and "children eat too much candy."  With the 
help of universal laws like this — and indeed only with their help 
— the observer is able link the event to the facts and thereby 
deduce the cause of the child's illness.  The process of deduction 
therefore looks like this: 
                                         
Society (note 24), 2:364, with A. Donagan, "Historical Explanation: The 
Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered," 4 History and Theory 3, 5–7 (1964), 
and K. Minogue, "Does Popper Explain Historical Explanation?," in A. 
O'Hear (ed.), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems [ Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 39] (Cambridge, 1995), 229. 
42  That is, suggesting a law and testing its predictive power: Popper, 
Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 130–31. 
43  Popper treats historians (as distinct from other social scientists) 
in: Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 130–47; "The Bucket and the Search-
light" (note 31), 354–55; Open Society (note 24), 2:259–80; "On the Sources 
of Knowledge and Ignorance," in Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed. 
(London, 1989), 23–24, 27; "Pluralist Approach to History" (note 33), 138–
50; Letter from Karl Popper to the Editor, New Scientist, August 21, 1980, 
at 611; "Historical Explanation: An Interview with Sir Karl Popper," 
University of Denver Magazine, June 1966, at 4, 4–7. 
44  For what follows, see Popper, Open Society (note 24), 2:262–63; 
idem, "The Aim of Science," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Approach, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1979), 191–93, and the authorities cited above, 
note 43. 40  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
 
Universal Law(s) (too much 
candy makes people ill, 
children eat too much 
candy)   
Conditions, both 
1.  known (the child 
was in the candy 
shop) 
Explicans 
 
2.  supposed (the child 
ate candy) 
Explicandum 
 
Event (the child fell ill) 
The lesson of this syllogism is that, in Popper's view, the observer 
in the candy shop has played an important part in his own con-
clusion.  Before entering the shop he had certain universal laws in 
the back of his mind.  He then combined those universal laws 
with certain facts, both known and supposed, to create a hypothe-
sis about what had happened. 
Popper offers this as a model of causal explanation for all sci-
ences, and as already mentioned, Popper expressly includes histo-
rians among the class of scientists.  The main difference between 
the (conventional) scientist and the historian, he says, is that they 
are interested in different things: the scientist gives more of his 
attention to the universal laws, while the historian pays little if 
any attention to the laws, giving his attention instead to the 
conditions.  Thus, the scientist tests his laws in the hope of dis-
covering their accuracy, while the historian looks for the condi-
tions which will explain why an event took place.  The method, 
however, is the same. 
  What are these laws that the historian uses but does not pay 
attention to?  Some of them are indeed physical laws; if a histo-
rian wants to explain the failure of Napoleon's Moscow campaign, 
he can make a causal link between the conditions and the event 
only with the help of certain meteorological laws, none of which 
he needs to mention.  But the laws that Popper has principally in 
mind for historians are more human: they are the trivial, obvious, 
psychological laws which the historian uses without thinking.45  
They are essentially a body of routine expectations about human 
                                         
45 See  Popper,  Open Society (note 24), 2:264–65; idem, "The Bucket 
and the Searchlight" (note 31), 354; idem, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 
145. 2004  Quare?  41 
 
 
behaviour accepted by the historian and his audience, but passed 
over in silence; for this reason I prefer to call them "expecta-
tion/laws."  Here is an example: a historian wishes to explain 
"why the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom resigned in 
1990."  In looking for the conditions which explain this event, he 
would almost certainly select this condition: "the prospect of fail-
ure on the forthcoming ballot."46  This condition, however, would 
be a "cause" of the Prime Minister's resignation (and indeed would 
come to the historian's notice) only because the historian 
subscribed to a relatively trivial expectation/law of human be-
h a v i o u r ,  s u c h  a s  " p e o p l e  w i t h  n o  prospect of winning give up."   
This "law" is therefore logically indispensable for making the 
causal connection between the condition and the event, but it is 
not very interesting, and would almost certainly go unremarked.  
It serves the same purpose, and is as equally uninteresting, as 
"children eat too much candy" in the example I gave above. 
What one notices right away, however, is that these expecta-
tion/laws are not really "laws."  For example, the law I have just 
given, on people giving up, is obviously false: some people do not 
give up even when there is no hope of winning.47  The problem is 
that the kinds of human laws Popper puts forward do not logically 
explain ("cover") the historical events they purport to explain,48 
and this seems to weaken substantially the argument that his-
torical explanation is causal in the same way that (conventional) 
                                         
46  See M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), 855: 
"I had lost the Cabinet's support.  I could not even muster a credible cam-
paign team.  It was the end." 
47  See, e.g., R. H. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York, 1990), 
311–12.  "Defeat was certain," says Bork of the vote on his confirmation to 
the Supreme Court, id. at 311, but a "simple emotional reaction" told him 
"it was better to fight than to run."  Id. at 312.   
48  The problem, in brief, is that if a law is successfully to explain 
why certain conditions produced an event, then that law ought to be true, 
and it is very difficult to formulate any law of human action that is true in 
all its applications.  Popper gives various examples of physical, economic, 
and sociological laws, see Popper, Open Society (note 24), 2:264–65; idem, 
Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 61–63, 145.  Popper admits: "Nothing is 
here assumed about the strength of the available evidence in favour of 
these hypotheses whose formulations certainly leave much room for 
improvement."  Id. at 63.  Donagan shows that none of these examples are 
laws, such as would support Popper's view of causal explanation in 
history.  Donagan (note 41), 14–17.  (But see the quote in note 49 below.)  
Other critical literature is cited in G. Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics 
and Scientific Method (Cambridge, 1998), 82, and C. Simkin, Popper's 
Views on Natural and Social Science (Leiden, 1993), 126. 42  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
scientific explanation is.  This is a problem that Popper acknowl-
edged but dismissed as unimportant,49 for the following reasons.     
  Popper wanted historical explanation to be as objective and 
"testable" as possible, even while recognizing that permanent 
laws of human behavior, or laws of history, were unachievable.50  
The fact that such laws are unachievable does not prevent a his-
torian from silently assuming that specific individuals acted in 
ordinary and predictable ways, and on that assumption explain-
ing the causes of some specific event.  There is no "law" that hu-
mans act in ordinary and predictable ways, but it is nevertheless 
sometimes useful to assume they do so, because it makes it possi-
ble to compare one historical explanation with another.51  If there 
is broad agreement about the "laws" — how the historical players 
are expected to have acted — then one historian can make a logi-
                                         
49  See "Interview with Karl Popper" (note 43), 5 (emphasis added): 
"[M]y theory of historical explanation is [far removed] from what cer-
tain people have been discussing — the completely uninteresting, 
though logically valid, claims about universal laws.  Really, I found 
the discussions which centered around my remarks on the question of 
the background of universal law so bad that I did not even answer my 
critics." 
This rare statement, from an interview in a college magazine (!), is one of 
the few places where Popper makes clear his attitude to universal laws in 
historical explanation.  
50  Readers of Popper will know that in his political works he devoted 
much scholarly energy to banishing, so far as possible, generalizing 
statements about history, statements which ostensibly allow one to predict 
future events on the basis of rhythms, patterns, trends, and laws, but 
which, in Popper's view, are capable of doing no such thing.  See Popper, 
Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 3; Popper, Open Society (note 24), 1:7–10; 
Skagestad (note 4), 17–19.  This appears to cause some conflict with his 
claim that historians seek causal explanations, a conflict which he at-
tempts to resolve by (1) a recommendation that historians use "situational 
analysis," discussed below, and (2) a claim that human behavior cannot be 
explained en masse, but only person by person, the so-called "metho-
dological individualism."  On the latter, see Popper, Poverty of Historicism 
(note 24), 136. 
51  Popper suggests what he calls the "zero method" or "rationality 
principle," where the historian assumes for the sake of argument that the 
human actors are behaving rationally and in full possession of all relevant 
information.  Popper, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 141–42; idem, "Mo-
dels, Instruments, and Truth," in M. A. Notturno (ed.), The Myth of the 
Framework (London, 1994), 169–70.  The principle is false, but allows 
deviations to be observed: N. Koertge, "Popper's Metaphysical Research 
Program for the Human Sciences," 18 Inquiry 437, 440 (1975); A. O'Hear, 
Karl Popper (London, 1980), 163–64. 2004  Quare?  43 
 
 
cally better case than another.52  In the example I gave above, a 
historian might point out that the Prime Minister resigned, not 
only with an unfavorable ballot in prospect, but did so immedi-
ately after her colleagues withdrew their support.  By bringing in 
this additional condition, the historian has explained more of the 
event: not only why the Prime Minister resigned, but when.  In 
this respect it is a logically better explanation, and it is an ac-
ceptable explanation because no historian is likely to dispute, or 
even pay much attention to, the uninteresting psychological 
"laws" that link the conditions to the event.53 
Popper calls this "situational logic" or "situational analysis."  
It follows the same deductive model as the natural and social 
sciences, the principal difference being that the historian's laws 
do not predict anything about the future.54  They serve only to 
help explain the causes of a specific, past event, by showing how 
that event logically follows from certain conditions.55  There is an 
undeniably subjective component to this exercise: the historian 
selects the event he wants to explain, and has some freedom also 
in selecting the relevant laws.  But this does not prevent a group 
of historians with similar interests discussing whose conditions 
make more logical sense, and accordingly who has the best expla-
nation.56 
                                         
52  See K. Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences," in In Search of a 
Better World (London, 1992), 79–80; idem, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 
149–51; idem, Open Society (note 24), 2:97, 265–68; idem, "On the Theory 
of the Objective Mind," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Ap-
proach, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1979), 178–80; idem, "Models" (note 51), 165–68; 
idem, "Pluralist Approach" (note 33), 146–50.  
53  In asserting these laws are uninteresting, one wonders if Popper 
is simply expressing his hope rather than his opinion.  See A. Boyer, 
Introduction à la Lecture de Karl Popper (Paris, 1994), 228: "Popper insiste 
sur leur caractère le plus souvent trivial. . . .  Peut-être Popper est-il sur ce 
point trop sensible au modèle de l'histoire politique dont il conteste par 
ailleurs le privilège."  Minogue is bothered by the fact that, according to 
Popper, some events are explained causally, while others are unique 
("brute facts"), an incoherence that suggests to Minogue that the scientific 
model is the wrong one for history.  See Minogue (note 41), 230–32.   
54  Unlike the other sciences (including the social sciences), history is 
not, to Popper, a "theoretical" science.  Popper, "The Bucket and the 
Searchlight" (note 31), 354–55; idem, Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 
143–47.  In the Open Society, the "theoretical" sciences are also the "gen-
eralizing" sciences, a term that reveals Popper's purposes somewhat more 
clearly.  See Popper, Open Society (note 24), 2:263–64. 
55 Popper,  Poverty of Historicism (note 24), 144. 
56  Popper's biographer notes: "No historical school regards Popper's 
situational logic as having inspired their work, but he elucidated 
wonderfully, if all too briefly, the premises underlying widely used prac-
tices in history and social science."  Hacohen (note 30), 494. 44  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
V.  Summary, and two examples from Roman law 
Popper's views on historical explanation can be summed up very 
briefly.  He says that historians who believe their task is first to 
gather evidence, and then to examine the evidence for patterns, 
misunderstand not only historical explanation but scientific ex-
planation generally.  They are imitating what they wrongly believe 
to be the method of science.57  An "evidence first" approach is an 
illusion: evidence that ostensibly explains some event is invisible 
unless illuminated by some hypothesis.  The hypothesis may 
include some facts, but its main component is some sort of expec-
tation/law which shows how the evidence explains the event.   
"Hypothesis first" is therefore the reality of historical explanation, 
as of scientific explanation generally.58  I suggest below that 
Daube practiced this very method: he treated texts as events to be 
explained, as it were, causally; he brought to every text a body of 
expectation/laws about how jurists and others think; and with the 
help of evidence (and indeed sometimes without its help) he 
sought to explain as closely and accurately as possible the condi-
tion of the text. 
Before giving examples from Daube's own work, I give two 
examples from the work of other authors, to illustrate how these 
views work with legal texts.  The simplest example (for reasons 
which will become clear below) is an argument which uses two 
texts by the same author.  Watson quotes Paul's famous definition 
of furtum in D.47.2.1.3 (39 ad edictum):59 
                                         
57  Popper, "On the Theory of the Objective Mind" (note 52), 186: 
I . . . accuse at least some professional historians of "scientism": of 
trying to copy the method of natural science, not as it actually is, but 
as it is wrongly alleged to be.  This alleged but non-existent method is 
that of collecting observations and then "drawing conclusions" from 
them.  It is slavishly aped by some historians who believe that they 
can collect documentary evidence which, corresponding to the 
observations of natural science, forms the "empirical basis" for their 
conclusions. 
Similarly: Popper, "Pluralist Approach" (note 33), 140. 
58  Among the problems in Popper's theory of historical explanation is 
the suggestion that causal explanation is somehow the beginning and end 
of the historian's job.  Donagan defends Popper in this respect, saying that 
Popper intended to do nothing more than discuss causal explanation.   
Minogue has the opposite view: "Popper has generalized scientific method 
to a level at which it can cover any kind of rational attitude at all.  He has 
not incorporated the element of meaningfulness which marks off the 
human world."  Minogue (note 41), 227. 
59  A. Watson, "The Definition of Furtum and the Trichotomy," 28 T. 
v. R. 197, 197 (1960) [= A. Watson, Studies in Roman Private Law 
(London, 1991), 269]. 2004  Quare?  45 
 
 
Furtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa lucri faciendi gratia 
vel ipsius rei vel etiam usus eius possessionisve, quod lege 
naturali prohibitum est admittere. 
Theft is the fraudulent interference with a thing for the sake 
of gain, whether in respect of the thing itself or of the use or 
possession of it.  It is something natural law forbids. 
Watson doubts "this is to any great extent the work of Paul."60  He 
offers several arguments for the point, but one particular ar-
gument is based on the following text from Paul's Sentences, a 
later work:61 
Fur est qui dolo malo rem alienam contrectat. 
A thief is one who maliciously interferes with another's prop-
erty. 
If we accept that Paul is the author of the Sentences, and that the 
Sentences were written after the commentaries on the edict, then 
we have difficulty explaining why Paul has retreated from a good 
definition to an inferior one.  Watson's conclusion: that the text in 
the commentaries on the edict are, to some degree, not Paul's (a 
matter Watson goes on to discuss in detail).62 
  The hypothesis-first view is the view that the text from Paul's 
Sentences does indeed support Watson's conclusion, but that it 
does not somehow spontaneously make its meaning known, rather 
that it has been selected by Watson on the basis of a certain 
hypothesis to which Watson subscribes.  The hypothesis contains 
two assumed facts (that Paul is the author of the Sentences, and 
that the commentaries were written first), but its main compo-
nent is a tacit expectation/law.  In this example, as in most exam-
ples, the expectation/law cannot be stated free of all guesswork, 
but it is perhaps something like this: 
A jurist is consistent in his views. 
Unless a jurist is consistent in his views, the text from Paul's 
Sentences signifies nothing about the authenticity of the other 
definition.63  This expectation/law is not, of course, a permanent 
                                         
60  Id. 
61 Paul's  Sentences 2.31 (E. Seckel and B. Kuebler (edd.), Iurispru-
dentiae Anteiustinianae Reliquias, 6th ed. (Leipzig, 1911), 2:64)). 
62  Watson (note 59), 197–98.  
63  To complete the explanation, the law must be able to be univer-
salized, because otherwise it is only an ad hoc statement.  Popper, "The 
Aim of Science" (note 44), 192–93.  But in this example, many different 46  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
law of behaviour.  It expresses only the expectation Watson brings 
to his problem, an expectation that draws his attention to the text 
from Paul's Sentences and gives the text its significance.  Without 
the expectation/law, the text does not "mean" anything.  This is 
how Popper would describe Watson's argument.64 
In the study of Roman legal texts, hypotheses in Popper's 
sense are therefore most evident, and least remarked, when a 
person follows some obvious thread.  A person who needs guid-
ance on the meaning of a text may, for example, look for similar 
texts: texts from the same era, by the same writer, using the same 
expression, written in the same hand, found in the same 
manuscript, etc.  He does not, however, look for texts written at 
the same altitude, or in the same color of ink.  Why not?  Because 
there is no expectation/law that says texts written, e.g., at the 
same altitude have anything to do with one another.  A person is 
interested only in texts which explain the text under review, and 
what he perhaps takes without reflection to be "similar texts" are, 
Popper would say, particular texts which some particular hy-
pothesis tells him will be helpful.  The expectation/laws within 
these hypotheses are not, of course, permanent and invariable: 
they are provisional and are often altered or abandoned as evi-
dence is gathered.  An expectation/law that seems too obvious 
even to mention may turn out to be the argument's main vulner-
ability.65  But without some expectation, a person will stand be-
fore a mass of evidence without a clue about what to look at. 
                                         
"universalizable" statements are possible, e.g., "a person is consistent in 
his views," and "Paul is consistent in his views." 
64  The "hypothesis first" view is epistemological, not logical, and 
therefore is not a view that "all statements are analytic" or "all knowledge 
is a priori."  A hypothesis, on this view, is not a source of knowledge and 
does not need to be accepted as true by the observer.  Thus, to say that 
Watson has selected evidence based on certain expectations is not to say 
that he is reasoning a priori from these expectations.  Popper does seem to 
believe, however, that the mechanism for seeking knowledge this way is 
inborn, in a sense "psychologically a priori."  See K. R. Popper, "Science: 
Conjectures and Refutations," in Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed. 
(London, 1989), 47–48; idem, "Conjectural Knowledge" (note 26), 5 n.10; 
and especially Popper, "Two Faces of Common Sense" (note 28), 92: "The 
laws of nature are our invention, they are animal-made and man-made, 
genetically a priori though not a priori valid." 
65  Philological guidelines for interpolation provide easy examples of 
this vulnerability.  Assumptions about the Latin of the second and third 
centuries are based on the obvious expectation/law that "jurists of a cer-
tain time have an affinity of style" but, as Buckland points out, are called 
into question by the fact that much of this juristic work was the work of 
provincials.  W. W. Buckland, "Interpolations in the Digest," 33 Yale L. J. 
343, 344 (1924).  2004  Quare?  47 
 
 
The statement "a jurist is consistent in his views" is clearly 
the sort of trivial psychological law Popper had in mind in setting 
out his theory of historical explanation, and yet in this context the 
psychological law is anything but trivial.  A critic points out one 
problem in the word trivial:66 
[W]hile what Popper calls "the psychological part" of such ex-
planations is very often "trivial" in the sense of "obvious," it is 
not "trivial" in the sense of "unimportant."  The information 
that a man in traffic seeks to avoid injury and not to commit 
suicide is indispensable, even if it is often obvious, in ex-
plaining the way he moves. 
The problem in fact goes deeper than this.  An expectation like "a 
jurist is consistent in his views" is indeed an obvious one.  But a 
romanist might just as soon rely on an unobvious expectation, if it 
helps to explain the text.  It is not an unimportant point: as I dis-
cuss below, Daube often brings quite unobvious expectations to a 
text.  Here is an example from Honoré. 
The  actio de pauperie was not available if the animal had 
been provoked by a person.  Ulpian says: Sed et si instigatu alte-
rius fera damnum dederit, cessabit haec actio.67  But the word fera 
is out of place: in no event is there pauperies if the animal is fera, 
that is, an animal wild by nature.68  Why is fera in this text?  Part 
of the answer is not difficult: Honoré suggests that Ulpian proba-
bly did not give dederit a subject at all, leaving it to his readers to 
understand quadrupes.69  The person who edited this text missed 
the subject and decided to supply one.  But why fera specifically?  
That the editor, for example, "did not fully understand pauperies" 
might explain a slip, but why this very slip? 
Explaining fera is difficult, not (Popper would say) because 
there is anything intrinsically difficult about the text, but because 
the presence of fera is mostly invulnerable to our usual arsenal of 
hypotheses.  Honoré solves the problem by appealing to a very 
particular expectation/law.  Like Watson's it is (colloquially 
speaking) a "psychological" expectation, and like Watson's it is 
one that a reader understands intuitively.  But it is not one that a 
reader understands tacitly, so Honoré spells it out: "When some-
                                         
66  Donagan (note 41), 18. 
67  D.9.1.1.6 (Ulpian 18 ed.). 
68  D.9.1.1.10 (Ulpian 18 ed.).  This is presumably why the translator 
of this text in the Watson Digest gives "animal" for fera.  See Watson (ed.), 
Digest of Justinian, 1:276 (at D.9.1.1.6). 
69  A. M. Honoré, "Liability for Animals: Ulpian and the Compilers," 
in J. A. Ankum, et al. (edd.), Satura Roberto Feenstra (Fribourg, 1985), 
247. 48  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
one edits a text in a language which he can read but not compose 
in without strain, his best course is to copy words and phrases 
from the original."70  Honoré's evidence is D.9.1.1.7, where the ed-
itor has read fera.71  This text falls just after the text he is at-
tempting to explain, and Honoré says the editor returned to the 
prior text and "copied" to that text the fera he believed had been 
accidentally omitted. 
  Honoré's expectation/law is clearly less obvious than Wat-
son's, but on Popper's view of historical explanation, both writers 
are engaged in exactly the same exercise: finding evidence with 
the help of facts and some generalized expectation/law. 
  I now come back to our main text. 
VI.  Daube's treatment of D.18.1.37 
To recall: both Beseler and Daube sought to explain the interpo-
lated condition of D.18.1.37.  Beseler did so by induction from 
examples, restoring the text by removing a clause with a plainly 
non-classical  ideoque, and in the process removing other text 
associated with ideoque.  Daube objected to Beseler's restoration 
because Beseler had assumed, for no apparent reason, that the 
compilers had added an entirely new fact (that when the parties 
agreed on the sale of the land for as much as the seller's testator 
had purchased it, they did so in ignorance of the fact that the 
property had been given to the testator).  Daube's own solution 
offered no examples of what he believed had been done to the text; 
he relied instead on the explanation that the compilers were 
enthusiastic about Justinian's solution to a classical dispute about 
prices fixed by a third person, and that they clumsily applied it to 
this text. 
The main point is that the hypothesis-first view draws no 
methodological distinction between Beseler's and Daube's expla-
nation of D.18.1.37.  Beseler's explanation, on this view, is not the 
more objective because he has examples, nor is Daube's the less 
objective because he has no examples.  Beseler's explanation may 
be better than Daube's, but it is not more "scientific."  While an 
inductivist might believe that Beseler's ideoque-texts leapt out of 
the VIR without his help, the hypothesis-first view says that he in 
fact sought them out with the help of certain obvious psychologi-
cal expectation/laws, such as "a writer favors certain words and 
                                         
70  Id. 
71  Id.  The word fera, according to Honoré, is no more appropriate to 
D.9.1.1.7 than to the prior text, and accordingly the evidence matches the 
hypothesis only if the editor actually read fera in his source material for 
D.9.1.1.7, as Honoré argues.  See id. at 246–47. 2004  Quare?  49 
 
 
expressions."  Without this expectation, it would not even occur to 
him to look up ideoque, or any other word.  Of course Daube's 
evidence (C.4.38.15), on this view, is no less pre-selected or "the-
ory-laden" than Beseler's evidence.  The expectation/laws that 
precede Daube's selection of C.4.38.15 are simply less obvious, 
and less often used, than Beseler's.  Those that precede Daube's 
selection of C.4.38.15 are perhaps "the compilers were willing to 
alter texts out of sheer enthusiasm," or "the compilers were eager 
to advertise Justinian's reforms."  Daube's eyes would have 
passed over C.4.38.15 without stopping unless an expectation/law, 
such as one of these, told them to stop.  The hypothesis-first view 
is therefore not a rebuke to Beseler's method of argument.  It 
challenges only the idea that Beseler's evidence speaks without 
the intervention of Beseler; or that Beseler has given "reasons" for 
accepting his view, while Daube has not; or that Beseler's view is 
supported by evidence, while Daube has only given his opinion.72 
  The real difference between Daube's and Beseler's argu-
ments, on the hypothesis-first view, is in the nature of the respec-
tive expectation/laws.  Beseler's expectation/law is the sort of 
workaday assumption that philological arguments often rely on.  
It is in the category of these: a writer has a limited vocabulary; he 
has a style; he conveys what he intends to convey; he is conscious 
of misapprehensions; a word shares meaning with etymologically 
related words; two inflections of the same word are, nevertheless, 
the same word.  These kinds of generalizations make up an es-
sential stock of assumptions.  Their main shortcoming (Popper 
would say) is that, being so familiar, they may have a person 
reaching for "relevant" or "similar" texts without being aware that 
he is assuming anything in doing so.  Daube's treatment of 
D.18.1.37 is different in this respect.  His expectation/law, like 
Beseler's, makes a causal connection between the uninterpolated 
                                         
72  Popper would make the even stronger point, that those who favour 
Beseler because he has given examples in support of his view are straying 
into subjectivity.  See Popper, "On the Sources of Knowledge and Ig-
norance" (note 43), 25–27.  They are trying to support their belief (Popper 
would say) by inquiring after the truth of a source.  But inquiring after the 
truth of a source always requires a further inquiry into the sources of that 
source, an endlessly regressive exercise.  His point is that one ought to be 
inquiring about the validity, not the pedigree, of one's beliefs.  See also 
Miller (note 25), 37 ("[I]n science as in everyday life, it is whether our 
hypotheses are true or false that matters, not whether they are em-
pirically supported . . . .").  Popper acknowledges that a historian will 
always be interested in questions of pedigree, but argues that validity is 
nevertheless the ultimate aim.  Popper, "On the Sources of Knowledge and 
Ignorance" (note 43), 27. 50  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
text and the interpolated text, but it is less intuitive and Daube 
must therefore put it in full view. 
  Does the hypothesis-first view offer any reasons for preferring 
either Beseler's or Daube's explanation of D.18.1.37?  The answer 
is that it does, but only if the reader is willing to go along with the 
hypotheses.  This means the first step for the critic is a subjective 
one: he agrees for the sake of argument to adopt the same 
hypotheses as Beseler and Daube.  If he does not, none of their 
evidence will be even colorably relevant.  But after he accepts the 
hypotheses for the sake of argument, a genuinely objective dis-
cussion can follow.  It is then possible to discuss whether, as a 
matter of logic, the facts, the assumed facts, and the expecta-
tion/laws, adequately explain the condition of the text.  This is 
Popper's "situational analysis," and it is a model that puts 
Daube's treatment of D.18.1.37 in its best light.  Daube criticizes 
Beseler for not fully and adequately explaining the condition of 
the text.  That is the gist of his statement: "[O]ne can think of no 
plausible motive which might have induced anyone to turn Be-
seler's text into the present."73  What he means is that his own 
hypothesis, right or wrong, does the better job of explaining why 
D.18.1.37 looks as it does.74  His criticism relies on the kind of 
causal explanation discussed above: initial conditions and laws, if 
well conceived, will explain an event more precisely, because 
logically they are better at "covering" the event they purport to 
explain.  In this respect, Daube suggests, Beseler's argument falls 
short: his hypothesis does not cover the event.  In particular, it 
does not explain why (on Beseler's view) the compilers added a 
new fact, that both parties embarked on the sale in ignorance of 
the true state of affairs.  In short, if a reader accepts both writers' 
hypotheses at the outset, he may conclude that Daube's explana-
tion is made out better than Beseler's. 
VII.  Does Daube subscribe to Popper's views? 
Many of Popper's views cannot be attributed to Daube.  For ex-
ample, Daube does not avoid induction,75 and there is no reason to 
think that Daube equated his own method of research to a 
                                         
73  Daube, "Certainty of Price" (note 2), 18. 
74  Popper, in explaining why all historical interpretations are not of 
equal merit, gives the example: "[T]here are some [interpretations] that 
are unable to connect a number of facts which another interpretation can 
connect, and in so far 'explain'."  Popper, Open Society (note 24), 2:266. 
75  Daube relies on examples to explain the presence of tunc in the 
apodosis of a condition, in D. Daube, "Si . . . tunc in D.19.2.22 pr.," 5 RIDA 
(3rd series) 427, 427–29 (1958) [= Collected Studies, 2:723–25]. 2004  Quare?  51 
 
 
scientist's.  Where Daube and Popper do share views is on the 
matter of historical explanation.  Daube often interprets texts 
"causally," within a framework which Popper would describe as 
situational analysis, as in the example just given.  Daube puts 
together an account of facts and hypotheses, and asks us to judge 
his account, not principally for its support in the evidence, but for 
its power to explain the text.  That this is Daube's model, and that 
he is not shy of putting his answers before the evidence, are 
apparent from the fact that his inquiry starts with the question: 
how did the text come to its present condition?  The question itself 
is not part of any argument; it is instead a signal to the reader 
that Daube has looked at a text and noticed something which is 
not fortuitous.  The question, moreover, cannot be answered by 
citing evidence.  It can only be answered by a kind of story, giving 
facts and hypotheses which go to show how something which is 
not fortuitous found its way into the text.  The argument is 
framed as a condition: if you accept these facts and hypotheses, 
then the text will look just as we have it.  Supporting evidence is 
not strictly necessary.76  What the argument cannot do without is 
a hypothesis, that is, facts that are assumed, and expectation/laws 
by which the facts explain the text under review. 
  Hypotheses of this kind are Daube's strength.  He is very 
good at producing unexpected reasons to explain a text, and the 
reasons he produces do tend to explain the text closely.  Appreci-
ating Daube's work means appreciating how difficult it is to do 
this well.  It is difficult because hypotheses (on the views dis-
cussed here) are not derived from observation, deduced, or pro-
duced by any deliberate method or mental process at all.77  There 
is no way to determine in advance one's expectations of a text.  
The making of a hypothesis is an act of imagination: it may origi-
                                         
76  The text under review may itself be regarded as evidence for the 
hypothesis.  In other words, Popper's causal explanation sometimes con-
flates the event being explained and the evidence explaining it.  To some 
this will weigh against his explanation. 
77  "[M]y view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no 
such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical recon-
struction of this process."  Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (note 23), 
32.  "[I]t is irrelevant from the point of view of science whether we have 
obtained our theories by jumping to unwarranted conclusions or merely by 
stumbling over them (that is, by 'intuition'), or else by some inductive 
procedure.  The question, 'How did you first find your theory?' relates, as 
it were, to an entirely private matter . . . ."  Popper, Poverty of Historicism 
(note 24), 135.  Popper's views and the views of his critics are summarized 
in Magee (note 30), 31–33. 52  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
nate in chance, error, or a flash of brilliance.  Popper often cites78 
Albert Einstein's views on where theories come from, as in this 
letter he received from Einstein:79 
Altogether I really do not at all like the now fashionable 
[modische] "positivistic" tendency of clinging to what is ob-
servable. . . . I think (like you, by the way) that theory cannot 
be fabricated out of the results of observation, but that it can 
only be invented. 
The same view is expressed most clearly by Hempel,80 the (possi-
ble) co-author of Popper's view of causal explanation:81 
The transition from data to theory requires creative imagina-
tion.  Scientific hypotheses and theories are not derived from 
observed facts, but invented in order to account for them.   
They constitute guesses at the connections that might obtain 
between the phenomena under study, at uniformities and 
patterns that might underlie their occurrence.  "Happy 
guesses" of this kind require great ingenuity . . . . 
It is a kind of ingenuity Daube has a great deal of.  In the exam-
ple just given, it is remarkable to have seen D.18.1.37 as an ex-
ample of the compilers' enthusiasm for Justinian's reforms.  And 
this observation is a very typical one.  Daube's hypotheses are 
often unique because he imagines that the actors are performing 
according to psychological laws other than the obvious ones.  The 
laws are too remarkable to be passed over in silence, but not too 
remarkable to be believed.  They are the kind of laws Daube ex-
pects the reader to understand intuitively, as in these three ex-
amples. 
a)  D.12.5.5 (Julian 3 ad Urseium Ferocem).  The text concerns a 
condictio, but which one?82 
                                         
78  K. R. Popper, "Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge," in Objective 
Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1979), 257–58 & 
n.2; idem, Logic of Scientific Discovery (note 23), 32; idem, "Science" (note 
33), 95–96 & n.6 
79  Letter from Albert Einstein to Karl Popper, 11 September 1935, 
reprinted in Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (note 23), 458 (translated 
by Popper).  Einstein expresses the same opinion in his book of essays, A. 
Einstein, The World as I See It, trans. A. Harris (London, 1935), 125. 
80  See above note 41. 
81  Hempel (note 39), 15. 
82  See Daube, "Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5" (note 2), 33–36. 2004  Quare?  53 
 
 
Si a servo meo pecuniam quis accepisset, ne furtum ab eo fac-
tum indicaret, sive indicasset sive non, repetitionem fore eius 
pecuniae Proculus respondit. 
If someone received money from my slave to keep him from 
revealing a theft committed by the slave, Proculus gives the 
opinion that that money can be recovered, whether the re-
ceiver reveals or not. 
Pflüger treats this as the case of a slave who steals from his mas-
ter, and who passes on his master's property to another: the 
condictio furtiva is therefore, according to Pflüger, the action 
Proculus and Julian had in mind.83  This solution is supported by 
what appears to be a very similar text, this one from Ulpian:84 
Quod si a fugitivo meo acceperis ne eum indicares, condicere 
tibi hoc quasi furi possim . . . . 
But if you receive something from my runaway slave not to 
betray him, I may bring a condictio against you for it, as if 
you were a thief. 
Daube is unhappy with this solution for two reasons.85  First, if 
Julian does have in mind the condictio furtiva, then the matter is 
not so complex that he would feel the need to cite Proculus.  Sec-
ond, the phrase sive indicasset sive non adds nothing of any inter-
est if the slave's master is simply recovering his own stolen 
property.  These are Daube's two "questions."  He suggests that 
what Julian is not telling us is that the slave has stolen from a 
person other than his master.  The agreement with the receiver is 
therefore a datio ob rem, one which, moreover, reflects badly on 
the receiver.  This means that the action which Julian and Pro-
culus have in mind is not the condictio furtiva, but the condictio 
ob turpem causam.  And the receiver must restore the property 
notwithstanding res secuta, that is, even if he partly redeemed his 
character and kept his word, as Paul suggests:86 
                                         
83  H. H. Pflüger, "Condictio ex iniusta causa," 32 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 
168, 171 (1911). 
84  D.12.5.4.4 (Ulpian 26 ed.). 
85  For the points below, see Daube, "Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5" 
(note 2), 33–35. 
86  D.12.5.1.1–2 (Paul 10 Sab.).  Daube does not actually cite this text 
specifically, but his reference to restoration "in spite of res secuta" means 
that he probably had it in mind: Daube, "Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5" (note 
2), 35. 54  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
Ob rem igitur honestam datum ita repeti potest, si res, prop-
ter quam datum est, secuta non est.  Quod si turpis causa ac-
cipientis fuerit, etiamsi res secuta sit, repeti potest. 
So one may recover something given for an honest purpose if 
the purpose for which it was given does not ensue.  But if it 
was received for an immoral reason, recovery is allowed even 
if the purpose ensued. 
This explains, Daube says, why Proculus has added "sive indicas-
set sive non." 
The novelty of Daube's explanation is clearer if the two ex-
planations are expressed with the hypotheses foremost.  Pflüger 
expects to find an explanation of Julian's text in Ulpian's treat-
ment of the thieving slave in D.12.5.4.4 because a certain hy-
pothesis directs him there.  The hypothesis includes an assumed 
fact, that the slave in Julian's text is passing on his master's 
property, and an expectation/law, something like: 
On the same facts, jurists express the same opinions. 
Pflüger's argument, from this point of view, is this: "If we assume 
that Julian and Ulpian are talking about the same facts, and that 
Julian's opinion is the same as Ulpian's, then the action is a 
condictio furtiva."87  A very different hypothesis directs Daube to 
Paul's text on res secuta.88  Daube's hypothesis, like Pflüger's, 
includes an assumed fact (that in Julian's text the slave is not 
passing on his master's property), but his expectation/laws (he 
uses two) are considerably more creative than Pflüger's:89 
A jurist does not invoke another jurist for a trivial point. 
A jurist does not insert a proviso for no reason. 
Daube's argument, from this point of view, is this: "If we assume 
that the slave is not passing along his master's property, and that 
Julian has cited Proculus for a difficult point concerning res se-
cuta, then the action is a condictio ob turpem causam." 
                                         
87  This may seem like an unfair characterization of Pflüger's argu-
ment, but in fact the argument is no better in Pflüger's own words: 
"[K]ann über die Natur der condictio in den beiden Stellen eigentlich kein 
Zweifel sein.  Natürlich die condictio furtiva."  Pflüger (note 83), 171. 
88  See note 86 above. 
89  Daube does not state these rules; they are implicit in his ques-
tions.  Daube asks (I am paraphrasing): "why does Julian invoke Procu-
lus?," and "why does Proculus add 'sive indicasset sive non'?"  Daube, 
"Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5" (note 2), 33–34.   2004  Quare?  55 
 
 
This comparison between Pflüger and Daube does not, of 
course, show that Daube's argument is better than Pflüger's, only 
that his hypotheses are bolder.  To compare the two on the merits, 
the reader must first agree to accept both writers' hypotheses.  If 
he does so, he will see that Daube's argument explains more of the 
text than Pflüger's: why Julian has cited Proculus, why Julian 
has inserted the proviso. 
b)  D.18.1.28 (Ulpian 41 ad Sabinum).  The text concerns the 
disposal of a third person's property: 
Rem alienam distrahere quem posse nulla dubitatio est: nam 
emptio est et venditio: sed res emptori auferri potest. 
There is no doubt that a person is able to dispose of another's 
property, for there is indeed a sale, though it is possible to re-
trieve the thing from the purchaser. 
Daube notices three oddities which he attributes to abbreviation 
by the compilers.90  There is no reason to discuss the specifics 
except to say that, to Daube, these oddities are evidence that the 
text began as a text on the sale of a debtor's property by a pledge 
creditor, and that the compilers have used the text to make a 
general rule.91  Daube's question concerns the compilers reasons 
for making the general rule.  That they desired general rules is 
taken for granted: but why did they do it in this instance?  The 
rule they created made no change whatsoever from the classical 
law, and this is therefore different from the more familiar cases, 
where the compilers adapt an old rule to new circumstances, or 
generalize a rule that applies only in specific circumstances.92  
The explanation, Daube says, is that the compilers wanted a 
statement of the general rule, but were unable to find one: the 
classical jurists sometimes took a rule so much for granted that 
they never got around to stating it.  The rule permitting the dis-
posal of another's property is such a rule, and as evidence Daube 
gives several examples where the rule is implicit.93 
The creation of a particular general rule by the compilers is 
not ordinarily treated as anything remarkable, and it is a sign of 
Daube's creativity that he is able to argue that this general rule is 
                                         
90  Daube, "Generalisations in D.18.1" (note 2), 186–92.  The oddities 
he notes are (1) distrahere quem posse, which is clumsy; (2) nam . . . 
venditio, which adds nothing important; and (3) sed . . . potest, which is not 
sensitive enough to the time at which recovery is sought. 
91 See  Pal., 2:1167 (Ulpian 2874). 
92  Daube, "Generalisations" (note 2), 190–91.  
93  Id. at 186, 191.  Daube takes up this idea more extensively in "Das 
Selbstverständliche in der Rechtsgeschichte" (note 2). 56  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
different from other general rules.  He sees this as a special case, 
not because he has any evidence to that effect,94 but because he 
brings certain expectations to his reading of the text.  When he 
asks why the compilers took the trouble to generalize Ulpian's 
text instead of taking one ready-made, given that there was no 
change in the law,95 he means that the fact that they did so is not 
an accident.  Accordingly, the hypothesis with which he begins his 
argument comprises an assumed fact, that the classical jurists 
never got around to stating a general rule about the disposal of 
another's property, and an expectation/law, something like this: 
The compilers would not exert themselves more than neces-
sary. 
The critic of course will point out that Daube has no evidence for 
his conclusion (i.e., the negative proposition that the classical jur-
ists never stated a principle they took for granted), but for present 
purposes only the quality of the hypothesis is important. 
c)  Gaius, Institutes 1.5.  Writing about the legal force of constitu-
tiones, Gaius says: nec umquam dubitatum est quin id legis vicem 
optineat.  Daube wonders why Gaius is so eager to put the matter 
beyond doubt.96  Daube's conclusion is that there were indeed 
doubts about the force of constitutiones.  The hypothesis he uses 
to reach this conclusion assumes one fact, that Gaius himself was 
in doubt about the force of constitutiones, and one expecta-
tion/law, that a person will exaggerate his confidence if, in fact, he 
is in doubt.  Daube says: "Motivation of the type I ascribe to Gaius 
is perennial."97  The argument relies entirely on the hypothesis; 
there is no supporting evidence.98 
VIII.  The usefulness of putting hypotheses first 
The general lesson of Daube's method I take to be this.  There will 
often be a class of ready-to-hand evidence available to help a 
person understand some text.  It is ready-to-hand, not because it 
                                         
94  Examples of texts where the rule is implicit (which Daube gives) 
are not evidence that the rule was never stated. 
95  Daube, "Generalisations" (note 2), 190–91. 
96  Daube, "Das Selbstverständliche" (note 2), 12–13. 
97  As in the translated text: Daube, "The Self-Understood" (note 2), 
134. 
98  Or rather, the evidence he does cite, the Ghanan constitution, is 
not Roman evidence: Daube, "Das Selbstverständliche" (note 2), 13 n.48.  
Cf. A. M. Honoré, Gaius (Oxford, 1962), 118–21, who also takes Gaius' 
statement as untrue, but suggests that Gaius may be describing a point 
that was once disputed but no longer is.  2004  Quare?  57 
 
 
is necessarily the best evidence, but because it has been selected 
by the researcher partly on the basis of certain common or tacit 
expectations, many concerning human behaviour.  With enough 
imagination, one can read a text with different expectations, and 
in doing so perhaps bring a wider selection of evidence in tow.  
This wider evidence is not a priori inferior to the ready-to-hand 
evidence, only different.  The hope is that different expectations 
will reveal evidence which explains the condition of the text more 
closely.  And even if they reveal no evidence at all, different ex-
pectations alone may show in what direction a better answer lies. 
This is the lesson, and certain objections aside99 it is a useful 
one in several respects. 
(1)  It is useful to be reminded that evidence does not gain 
any probative value simply by being obvious.  Less obvious evi-
dence might explain something better, if one has the imagination 
to see it.100 
   (2)  A method like Daube's makes discussions more fertile, 
even when it fails to prove its point.  This is because (as Popper 
would put it) hypotheses have a value separate from their truth 
                                         
99  There are at least two serious objections that I do not address.  
Many would object that an argument that is not supported by evidence is 
not the equal of an argument that is.  Cf. note 72 above.  Also, many would 
object to the decisive role played by the expectation/law, which is neither 
proven true, nor even assumed to be true in most of its applications.  Cf. 
note 101 below. 
100 Birks gives a good example of this.  The second chapter of the lex 
Aquilia gave an action against an adstipulator who released the debt to 
the detriment of the stipulator, but the action fell out of use.  See Gaius 
3.216; D.9.2.27.4 (Ulpian 18 ed.).  Why did it fall out of use?  We have the 
"obvious evidence" in Gaius: he says that the action on mandate accom-
plishes nearly everything that an action on chapter two would accomplish.  
If we take our lead from Gaius we will look for an explanation in the rise 
of the action on mandate.  See F. H. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law 
(Oxford, 1950), 4 n.5; J. A. C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amster-
dam, 1976), 334.  But Gaius is not necessarily the best, the better, or even 
good, evidence on the subject.  Birks looks for the answer in currency 
fluctuation, and in doing so exposes Gaius' text as potentially misleading.  
P. Birks, "Wrongful Loss by Co-Promisees," 22 Index 181, 181–88 (1994).  
The explanation may be, says Birks, not that chapter two fell out of use, 
but that it was, in the first place, a kind of ad hoc legislation, enacted to 
answer the problem of the devaluation of the as.  The uncertainty of the 
value of the as provided the adstipulator an opportunity for deception that 
more stable times denied him.  Id. at 184.  Birks' solution is accomplished 
with a small but significant change of expectation: that those who wrote 
chapter two were eager to discourage, not a "wrong" per se, but a short-
lived opportunity for abuse.  This solution, correct or not, is invisible to 
one who unconsciously holds fast to certain familiar expectations, 
believing he has found the "best evidence" in texts directly on the lex 
Aquilia. 58  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
content.101  One might, for example, reject Honoré's explanation of 
D.9.1.1.6 discussed above,102 but at the same time accept that his 
hypothesis may be true in some unknown number of other cases.  
It is plausible to believe that someone who cannot write a foreign 
language competently might resort to copying the words of others.  
The very fact that Honoré has made this hypothesis known is 
useful, because it can become part of a common fund of hypothe-
ses and alert others to the possibility of reading texts from that 
point of view.  Similarly a reader, unconvinced that the compilers 
altered our principal text out of a desire to advertise Justinian's 
reforms, will nevertheless go away with a new weapon to use on 
some other text.  The better explanation may lie there, just as a 
difficult text may suddenly make sense if the reader considers the 
compilers' reluctance to exert themselves more than necessary, or 
a jurist's reluctance to cite other jurists for trivial points, or a 
jurist's tendency to exaggerate his opinion when he is in doubt, or 
any other plausible but unobvious explanation which Daube has 
proposed.  Hypotheses like these are unlimited in number, and 
each one has the potential to explain a text, but only imagination 
can uncover them. 
                                         
101 This is the notion of "explanatory power."  Any hypothesis, Popper 
says, has a certain extent of empirical content, which is to say that 
whenever a person formulates a statement about the world, as a matter of 
sheer logic a certain number of events fall within that statement. See 
Popper, "Two Faces of Common Sense" (note 28), 81. 
102 See note 71 above. 